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An ~~(~IimnmE cyurhhnum modcl of twn rnterde~endcnt monetart eatnomres wrth no other
a~~ct~ escept catih. ~cr(ect fr,retiighL Iletihle etchanKe rates and rmrerfecl suhstituuon hetween
hc~me and fc~reign Kn~~J~ i~ analt~ed Bnth non-morerauce and ccuireraUte market-oriented
~~utce~me. are Ume ma~nsrstent. srnce each gmernment ha~ an rncentne to reneEe and let} a
~urrnce inllau~m tat International poGc~ coordmation withc~ut pre-commitmrnt can be
cuuntcrprc~ducutc eten thi~uFh Ihere are no tax distortions and the protision of rublrc goods is
c~~umal. amcr rt etacerhate~ the credihilrtv prohlems perceited h~ the pritate sectors and
thercf~~re Icad~ Ic~ a tn~~ Ic~w le~el of real mcmet balances and exee~~i~e rnflatiun
1. Introduction
Rcccntl~ a great deal of attention has been dcvoted to international
c~~~rdinatit~n of monetary policies. The pioneering papers on international
con(lict in monetar~ stahilisation are Cooper (19691 and Hamada (1976). The
latter uses an n-country model with fixed exchange rates, based on the
monetar` approach to the balance of payments, to compare non-cooperative
and cooperative outcomes when each country chooses its own rate of credit
expansion to maximise a welfare function that depends on the common rate
of intlation and the balance of payments. If the creation of international
resen~es exceeds the weighted average of desired Ievels of the balance of
pa}ments, monetary expansion is a puhlic bad and competitive outcomes
Icad to excessive inllation. Hamada (1979) extends the anal~~sis to tlexible
c~change rates. Morc recently numerical simulation and differential game
thcory has bcen used to discuss the benefits of international policy coordina-
tit,n in analvtical two-countr~~ models of rcal-exchange-rate overshooting
with sluggish goods and elTcient financial markets, perfect capital mobility
and flexihle exchange rates when preferences depend on output and in(lation
[e.e. Curric and Levine 11985). Miller and Salmon 119R51. Oudiz and Sachs
(lyt~Sl. Rasar, Turnovsky and d'Orey (19R5)). Others have done the same,
t~ith mr,dels that incorporate the staggered ~age-setting hypothesis [Taylor
'I am Erate(ul (c~r the am~tructite cr`mments of Iwc. am.mmc~ut rrferee~ and fc~r Ihe finanaal
w(~~c~rt c~( the F.ceme~mrr and S~~aal Recearch ( ~~undl it' I:.I
IN)~~ 194(. KK C7 5(1 ~ I~KK. f:J~etier Science Puhh~hcr~ E3 `. I`c~rlii-Hc~ll: ndl
F. run drr PIneR, Cnurdinariun in intrrdependent mnnrrar~ ecnnnmies
I 19851, Carlozzi and Taylor 119851]. Typically, one finds that non-cooperative
monetary policies are too tight over the adjustment period and therefore
disinflation occurs excessively fast. However, if Central Banks cannot pre-
commit themselves, credibility problems are exacerbated and international
coordination may become counterproductive, as established in the pioneering
paper of Rogofí ( 19R5). Subsequent:y, Miller and Salmon (1985) have found
an example of counterproductive international policy coordination in
numencal simulations of an ad hoc two-country real-exchange-rate over-
shooting model.
The international coordination games cited above suffer frum tuo
prohlems. The first is the ad hoc specification of macroeconomic multi-
country models and welfare funetions. The discussion of such games will
benefit from using macroeconomic models with microeconomic foundations,
hecause then the welfare functions can be related to well-defined concepts
such as consumers' surplus and the derivation of subgame-perfect (or
crediblel equilibria between each government and its private sector becomes
more transparent [e.g. see van der Ploeg (1986b) for an analysis of
coordination of optimal taxation in a static two-country model with micro
foundations]. This might therefore shed new light on the derivation of time-
consistent policies, which is crucial in any discussion of the benefits of
international policy coordination. The second problem with previous studies
is that they do not allow for a genuine long-run trade-off between in(lation
and acti~ity. This means that international policy coordination is a transient
issue and is concerned with the efficient adjustment towards given long-run
targets. However, when there is a long-run con0ict in international objec-
tives, there is a more systematic role for coordination of monetary policies.
The ohjectives of this paper are therefore to investigate the desirability of
international policy coordination with and without pre-commitment within
the context of a classical model of two ínterdependent monetary economies
Hith micro foundations and a genuine long-run trade-ofT hetween inflation
and output. In this sense, this paper attempts to reproduce the results
derived originally in Ragoff ( 1985) within a more satisfactory framework. In
fact, RogolT (1985, section 3) informally suggests that unanticipated monetary
policy may have beneficial efi'ects in the presence of distortionary taxation of
income and this paper attempts to formalise these efTects within a tu~o-
country world. Kehoe (1986, 1987) has also developed a numher of internally
consistent models of international policy coordination. They are based on a
two-country version, ~~~ith labour immobility, savings mobility and lincar
technoiogies, of Fischer's ( 19801 model of the time inconsistency of dynamic
optimal taxaUOn of capital and lahour. Kehoe also obtains thc result that
coordination without pre-commitmentt can be counterpmductive. hut his
model is perhaps less realistic than RogofT's ( 1985) model, as it abstracts
from monctary factors.
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Section ' sets up the micro foundations of a model of two interdependent
monctar~ econc~mic~ v, ith (lexihle exchange rates and imperfect suhstitution
hct~~rcn homc an~i fc~rcign goods. It correspond~ to a two-cc~untr` vcrsion of
thc mndcl anal~~cd in Calvo 1197K1. Section 3 discusscs thc first-hcst
c~htimum fc~r thc ac,rld cconomy, which givcs risc to no distortionary taxcs,
c~ptimal provi~ic~n rf puhlic goods and Friedman~s oplimal quantity nf
nrc~nc~. Scction J deri~es the perfect-fore~ight ~t,lution for rcal money
halanceti anci the indircct utilities in terms of tax rates and level of
cr~crnmcnt ~rcncfing at homc and ahroad. Scction 5 shows that hoth the
co[~rcrali~r anel nc~n-cooperative market-oriented outcumes ti~ith pre-
ce~mmitmcnl are time inre~nsistent, since each government has an incentive to
Ir~~ :r surprisc in(laticin tax, which permits a decrease in taxes or increase in
~ovrrnment ~pending and therehv increases welfare. This time inconsistency
aritic~ despite thc fact that each government maximises the utility of the
represcntative household. Section 6 shows that international policy coordina-
tion ti~ithout pre-commitment can be counterproductive, since it exacerbates
the credihility constraints vis-à-vis the private sectors and therefore Ieads to
cxcessive in(lation. The point is that competitive decision-making has a huilt-
in disincentive to renege. since a surprise inllation tax induces a depreciation
of the real exchanee rate and imposes in(lation costs. Credible policy
coc~rdinalion doe~ not induce a depreciation and therefore does not have
such a disincentive to renege. Section 7 provides a numerical example and
secuc,n R concludes the paper. The appcndix criticises the loss of leadership
dcri~ation of credible strategics and suggests suhgame-perfect strategies as an
altcrnativc.
2. A two~ountrv ~eneral equilibrium model
This section c~nsiders a two-country general equilibrium model with
(lc~ihlc prices and imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods.
Households and firms in each country onl~ hold domestic cash and no other
domestic or foreign assets. There is, iherefore, neither capital nor labour
mohilitv. The go~ernment levies distortionary taxes on income from produc-
tion and also imposes 'inflation taxes' in order to finance the pmvision of
puhlic goods. For simplicity, Cobh-Douglas utility functions and linear
technologies are adopted, although the gcneral expressions are also given.
The home household decides on its consumption of home and foreign
goods, rr, and cM. lahour supply, 1`. and holdings of real money halances, m.
Its utilitv function is eivcn hv
,
(cxpl -r~rl( Irr,.rN.l',,t.mldl- (cxpl-rirl[x~ loglc~nlfx.loglc'M)
3 F run drr PIurR, Cnordinaiion in ~nrerdrprndrn~ monrtun rrnnom~es
f x, log( I-1`) t-x,, log(~I f ~~1m1] dt.
x, fxztx,tx4-1.x,?0,,.,-(m1J0. (1)
where ~i denotes the pure rate of time prefercnce and ~ denotes the level of
public spending. U( . I is assumed to be separable in cp, cM, I`, K and m.
Feenstra (19R6) argues that having real money balances in the uti!ity
function can be consistent with a transaction technology. There exists an m,
say mr, such that Um-r'(m)-0 and this will be called Friedman's optimal
quantity of money (OQM) (Friedman (1969)]. The home household max-
imises ( I) subject to its budget constraint:
rim-11 -TIIN~I`~-c)-cp-ecM-nm, (?)
where T, N~, -, e and n denote the tax rate on labour income, the real wage
rate, real profits, the real exchange rate and the rate of home inflation,
respectively. It follows thal Cp-Cp(I,)-x,~I,, CM-CM(PG)-x~!PG, !`-
L`(11 - r)~ci.) - I- x„~( 1- TjN~i., so that home goods, foreign goods and leisure
arc normal as preferences are ~enarable. Also,
í.-lhfn`li.-r'Iml, limexp(-~~~r-r!~lilr)-0, 13)
where i. is the marginal value of money balances, must hold. Hence, ~~me
consumption of home goods, foreign goods and leisure are a decreasing
function of the marginal value of money balances. Also, imports fall when
the real exchange rate depreciates and the supply of labour increases when
the after-tax real wage increases. Eq. (3) says that the representative
household sets its marginal utility of money balances. r'(m),i. ( expressed in
mc~nctary units), to the rate of time preference, b, minus the expected real
instantaneous return on holding cash balances, - n`, minus the rate of
appreciation of the marginal value of money balances, - i.~i..
The home econom}~ has a very rudimentary production sector. There is a
representative firm with a non-increasing-returns-to-scale technology, f I~ I,
which chooses its demand for labour, W, to maximise profits, ~, under perfect
competition. Hence, the firm hires labour until thc marginal productivity of
labour equals the real wage, J'(Id)-N~. Labour market equilibrium, 1a-!`,
then gives 1- L`(I 1 -T1("(1)i.) - LI(1 - Tli.), L' ~0. Money market equilibrium
gives N- n t rii~m, so that the growth in the nominal supply of money, u, is
matched with the growth in the nominal demand for money. The govern-
ment budget constraint of the home economy can be written as
Nn~-d-X-tI((), I~I
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so that the puhlic sector deficit, the excess of public spending over tax
revenues. has tt~ hc f"inanced lin the absence of any other f~rm of government
a`tict~l h~ printing mc~ncy.
Thc furcign ccont,m} has identical tastes and {~refcrcnces and thc same
~~~rulation sire. Alf foreign variahles and expressionc are denoted hv an
:t.tcri.k. Goc~ds markct cyuilihrium follc~ws frc~m Ihe naticinal acct~unting
tclcnUt~
J1II-ct,-~s;fc~~t.
F-inall~, cxchangc market cyuilihrium follows from balanccd tradc'
C;,(i.' i~1-c~Cr.,~c~i.).
~hich givcs thc cyuilibrium real cxchange rate:
( S)
c~ - E( i., i. `1- i.','i., ( ~)
where E;-c`C'„~rM(rF-~q'-1)~0 and E,,.--CM'~cMlnf7~-II~O as the
Marshall--Lerner condition, -(i.c'CM~c'M)-(L'C;' c~cM)-I -pfr!'-1 ~0,
v,hcrc q and r~' arc thc import and cxport clasticitics, is assumcd to be
satisfied. Since F~I I is homogeneous of degree zero in i. and i.', cM -
CM(l;(L.I,'I11-CM(i,')-x2ii.'. An increase in the marginal value of domestic
Iforeignl money halances leads to decreased imports Iexports) (or the home
economy and the resulting incipient trade surplus ( deficit) is choked ofT bv an
afrpreciation ( depreciation) of the real exchange rate.
When the above relationships are combined with the perfect foresight
hypothesis, n` - n, one obtains the perfect foresight equilibrium ( PFE) which
givcs the endogenous variables conditional on expectations of current and
future values of the government's policy instruments. In particular, the
demand for real money balances depends negatively on the expected in(lation
r:rte and thereforc the price level is history-independent and jumps in order
to maintain money market equilibrium. Since the price level changes
instantaneously in response to news ahout future changes in governmcnt
policy, real money balances also change instantaneouslv. The objective of
cach government is to choose its fiscal and monetarv policies to maximise
the utilih of its representativc consumer subject to the ct,nstraints of the
PFI-.
~C~~mh,mnF thc hc~ucehold and gocernment hud~et conctraint and the goods market
equ,l,hnum condu,on. one ~~htain~ the condiuiin for balanced trade Hence. ~~ne of IZ1. I~1. 151
and I61 ic redundant
6 F- ran der PlueX. Cr~n.dinai~nn in ~n~i~rdependenr m~~nr'tan ernnnmirs
3. First-best optimum for the world economy
Before a discussion of cuordinated and unrnordinated optimal taxatiun uf
interdependent decentralised market economies takes place, it secros useful to
brie(ly discuss the first-best optimum for the wurld eeconomy. The first-best
optimum is useful as it gives an upper bound on the welfare that can be
ubtained in a system of interdependent market economies. It can be ohtained
aS f011(lw'S:
max f exp( - ~Sr); C~1 p. ('M.1.R, ml -~ C"Ic~, CM. ~',I's, m') ~ di. I~I
~u.~i...f.a.m 0
subject tu the world balance condition:
I~~)f I.I~~)-('V~-QfCMfCp~-~,~-fCM. (9)
Hence, the world planning authority maximises a utilitarian global welfare
function subject to ensuring that the world demand for guods matches the
wurld supply of goods. This yields:
,.
U~~,-U~M- ~.,(~~-C,9-b~.~-~,.M- f~Í t)-~r9 -~ I10)
and
r'~nr) - ~.s-(m`) - 0, ( 1 I )
where s is the marginal utility of an extra unit of output. The marginal rate
of substitution between home and foreign consumption of home, public and
fureign guods is unity and the marginal rate of substitutiun between the
cunsumption of goods and leisure is the marginal productivity of lahuur.
This corresponds to no tax distortions in a system of interdependent market
ernnomies (T - T' - 0). Eq. I I 1) says that the marginal utility of home and
fureign money balances is zero, so that Friedman's OQM pertains
(rn-rn'-niFl.
It follows that the (non-marketl first-best optimum fur the world cconomy
can be characterised by three conditions: (il the marginal rate of suhstitutiun
bctween public and private gouds is unity; liil nu tax distortiuns; and liiil
Fnedman's OQM. Notc that the implied monctary growth ratc is ~r-~,~ m,,
so that, in general, the full liyuidity rule, p-- b, does not huld in a first-hetit
uptimum. Thc full liquidit} rule is unly relevant w'hen markct eyuilibrium is
a cunstraint on pulir}; in a market outcome it is feasihle tu ensure full
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liyuidity when the ~o~~ernment of each rnuntr~~ can issue honds as well as
rrint m~)nc~ ~cC Turno~sk~ and Brock (19R01]..
F-c)r the ~recial case of C~ohh Uouglas ~references and linear technoloeies.
l lll - ~il, c~nc ohtains ;- I ~i, c„- ri - x,,;, (~M - rM - xz~;, R-.Y` - xa~l- I- 1-
I I` - x, and thcrcfc)rc
C'-C''-x,Ic~glx,l ~x.loclx.)fx,log(x, ~I1~x41oglx,)
-~ I~~gl~(1~ r;m, I - C'`.
Thc as~ociatcd monctan grc~wth rates are gi~~en hy 1~-1r'-x,~'mF.
4. I)erivalion of the perfecl-foresi~ht equilibrium
Suhstitution of thc consumption and labour su~~l~ functions into (5),
~( L(( I- TIG11-~ U(L) -~,~}~ M(~). (1;)
~icldti the marginal utilit} of money balances:
i.-,1(r.,Yl- ~x, fx2f x;;ll -r);!(~3-gl, (14)
wherc .~4-;f'L'lI -TI-Có-CM'; '~0 and ~tt-~'I'i.,1a~0. Upon substi-
tution of 114) into the labour supply function one obtains:
. ~-~ a a
(I1 - tl.~(t.,el) - U t. R) - 1 -(~-Klx3ii l'(Ix~ f xZ)I1 - T) f 7(j)j . (15)
and therefore the public sector deficit, ( 4), can be written as
~ 1 ~~~
II-.C'-t.~ILIT.,Y)1-~( T . ,Q )
-;Rlx, ~ xz f x,l - r~i(x, f x~ li'ix, f x. f xi!I 1- t);.




~~M-tr1dl.~' IT'..Y'11-C~M( r'.R')-xZl~-R'1~;x, -~x;f x,'(I -r')~. I1R)
ti F. run der PIneA. Coordinannn in in~erdeprndeni moneror~ ecnnomies
Upon substitution of (15), (17) and ( 1 S) into I i 1, one can write the indirect
instantancous utility function as
ii(Cfi(T.J;I.CMIi~,,~~I. U T,,QI.R. m)- l~(T,ce, T~,,L';1fl~In)
- x„ -(x, t x,) log ;x, f x. f x~í(1 - r)~ - x~ logl l- r)
- x: log ; x, f x. f x3 y I- r' I; t( x, f x~ I log (~3 -~,'I f x, log (R)
~ x: logl~-R'1 f r(ml, (19)
~~hcre x„- x, log(x, ) f xZ log(xZ) f x, log(x~í~i). Substitution of (14), (16) and
n` - rc -~~ - ~ii rn into ( 3) yields:
nt - m; ~i f D( r. R).'m - ( r'( m) t,1T 't f .~QK),',11 i, R) }
, ~ - ~ -
-~i(m, r, i,.K, R 1, m10) - free. (?0)
Eq. I~O) can be inverted to give the demand for real money balances as a
decreasíng function of the tax rate, level of public spending and the expected
in(lation rate, so that it gives a micro foundation of a Cagan-type money-
demand schedule. It is assumed that ~i,~--(dfm2r'"ji.);'m~0, w~hich will be
the case as long as the public sector deficit or the monetary grov,th rate is
not too large. Eqs (19) and (20) describe the reduced form of the perfect-
foresight equilibrium (PFEI. The instability of (20), i.e. ~i,~~0, reflects the
saddlepoint property of the PFE, for in the PFE the price Icvel and thus the
stock of real money balances are forw~ard-looking variables and depend upon
expectations of current and future values of the government's policy
instruments.
An increase in the home tax rate reduces the opportunity~ cost of leisure
and thus reduces the supply of labour and goods. This results in an increase
in the marginal utility of home money balances, which increases the home
supply of labour and output and dampens home consumption of home and
foreign goods. The resulting surplus in the current account Ieads to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate, w~hich dampens foreign consumptiun
of home g~ods. The above process c~ntinues until equilihrium in the goods
and foreign exchange markets is attained. The public sector deficit improves,
despite the decrease in the tax hase, so that the monetary growth rate can be
reduced. The net effect on the utility of the representative houschold is
ambiguous. sinre the fall in consumption worsens utilitv and the increase in
Ieisure improves utilih.
An increasc in homc public spcnding also Icads to an cxccss dcmand for
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home g~ods. which is ch~kcd off by an incrcase in homc suppl} and a fall in
hi,me and foreign ct~nsumption of h~me go~ds linduced hy an inrrease in the
m:rrcinal utility of mone~ halancesl. The net efTect on utilit~ is amhieu~us,
hccausc thc falls in cr~nsumption and Icisurc dctenoratc utilit~ and thc
incrca~ccl pro~isir~n of puhlic goods incrcascs utility. Thc puhlic scctor dcficit
incrca~cs. dcsrilc thc increasc in thc tax hasc.
Nt~ti ce~nsider the ezternalities induced hy changes in foreign policy. An
incrcasc in thc fi~rcign tax rate or Ievel of puhlic spending Ieads to a
rrdurtic~n in thc fr~rcign dcmand for homc go~ds. Thc incipicnt tradc deficit
iti chuked i~(T hy a depreciaticin of the home market exchange rate, which
reeluces hc~me consumption r~f foreign goods and therefore wt,rsens home
utility. Note that thesc extcrnalities only play a role in the indirect utility
function and dt~ not atTect the dynamics of the PFE, I'01.
5. Optimal taxation with pre-commitment of interdependent monetary
economie~
SJ. :~'r,n-r ru,~c~rcrlirc~ pr,lic~ic~s trirh ~rc-cnnunilmc~itr
The pmhlem of each government is to choose the tax rate and le~~el of
puhlic spending in such a way as to maximise the discounted utility of the





suhject to f201. The associated monetary growth rates follow from the
g~~crnment hudget constraint, i.e. N-D(r,g)!m. In this section it is assumed
that each government can pre-commit itself to the announced sirategies. This
c~~rresponds to committing itself, via constitutional law or institutíonal
constraints, to a particular path of tax rates and levels of public spending.
F~r deterministic economies, this implies a pre-commitment to a path of
monetary gmw~th rates. The non-cooperative or competitive policies are
discussed first.
The competitive policies assume that each government takes the policies
adopted by the other government as given, so that the resulting equilibrium
hetwecn the two governments is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.- The
separabilit} of the indirect utility function. 1191, means that the T~ash
eyuilihrium solution coincides with isolationist policies, i.e. the policies each
'The Fame helween each ~overnment and irs rnnsUluents is merdelled at a Stackelherg game
arlh ~re-rommmrrment, whrch ~relds an nrrn-Irii,p Stackelherg eyurhhnum si~luhon [S~maan
and ( rui I Iv7id~)
10 F run der PIueR, Cuurdinafiun rn rnrerdependent mnnetun ernnnmies
government would pursue when ignoring the repercussions of foreign poli-









where the ( undiscounted) Hamittonian is defined as H( )- V( -) f r~(m) f
i., ~y( ) t i.zt t i.,K. The stock of real money balances is nol constrained hy its
past htstory and can take on any value at the beginning of the planning
horizon. It follows that the marginal contribution to economic welfare of the
initial stock of real money balances must be zero, hence i.,(0)-U and, from
1'S1-{26), i.z10)-i.,(0)-0 [cC Calvo 11978)]. If the government were to
re-optimise at a later date, say t ~ 0, then the marginal utility of money
balances would be set to zero at that date, i.,(i)-0. It follows that the
optimal policies of the government are time consistent [see Kydland and
Prescott ( 1977)] only if i.,(r) - 0, tí t? 0. Since then there would never he an
incentive for the government to renege on its announced strategies.
Prnpu.~ititrn l. The optimal non-cooperatir~e policies are time inconiistcmt.
Prnof. If i.,(t)-0, Vt, then i.z(t)-i.3(t)-0, `dt, and from (22)~?4) r'(m)-
6,-LQ-O, t1t. lt follows that m(t)-mF, dt, r(t)-xz~(x,t~czl-r", dt, and
Xl t 1- x,(f,i(1 - xz )-R", V t. Substitution into (20) yields:
m-~ImF.t".O.R",01-bmF flxa-xz)xiQl(1 -x11(z, -~ xz1~0,
so that the non-cooperative plan cannot be time consistent. (]
The reason for this time inconsistency is that, in the absence of binding
contracts, pre-commitment or reputational forces, the government has an
incentive to increase the monetary growth rate and inllation in order to
erode the real value of money balances and thereby increase economic
welfare. The reason behind this incentive to renege is that the increase in
seignorage revenues pcrmits an instantaneous decrcase in taxes and increase
in government spending, which improves economic welfare. Note that this
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time inconsistency arises despite the fact that there is no con(lict between
pri~ate and puhlic objecti~es, since each government maximises the utility of
it~ rcpresentativc household.' The prohlcm with thc govcrnment rcneging
c~n it~ announccd ctrateeies is that expectations of the private sector are not
fulrlled and thcreforc thc go~~crnmcnt loses rcputation. Unless there are
hincline contracts that tie the hands of the Fo~~ernments, the non-cooperative
~c~licic~ frnmd frc~rn 1~(11 and 1~~I-1'bl will not be credible.
t.'. lrtk~rvnUiunul hnlic r rnr~rclirtalic~n
ln the pre~i~us section each go~crnment decided on its own policies
indercndent of the policies adopted hy the government of the other country,
which resulted in an open-Ic~op Nash eyuilibrium with pre-commitment for
thc world ernnomy. Coordinatcd policics may be found from maximising a
utilitarian wclfarc function for the world cconomy:
max (exp(-c5t)[I~)r,R,r',R')-f-r(m1f V' ~7~`,`Q~,T ,g)~-t~Im")]dt (27)
t.9. r'. 9~ O
suhject to the PFE of the home and foreign economy. The efficient policies
follc~w from 1'~1. 1 ~-').
I~-t- V'fi.t~t-bi.2-í.2, i.~(~)-p, ('-8)
t~yf VQ ~Lt1~IQ-(SL3-L3. ~J(0)-~. (~9)
~?5) and 1'61. and similar relationships for the foreign economy. The main
difference with non-cooperative strategies is that the world planner takes
account of the negative effects of higher taxes and public spending on foreign
welfare. The result of these externalities is that taxes and public spending are
higher with the non-cooperative outcomes than with the coordinated out-
comes. It can also easily be shown that the coordinated policies announced
by thc world planner are not credible, unless they are backed up by binding
contracts to prevent the world planner from reneging on the home and
foreign private sector agents and by binding coniracts to prevent each
country from deviating from the cooperative agreements.
Prnp~sifinn ?. The optimnl pnlicies under internatinnal fr~lici~ rnordination
x~ith Irre-crnnminnc'nt ure time inc'nnsistenl.
Prun(. If i.ilr)-t1, dt. then i.,(t1-i.;It1-r'Int1-0. 'dt, and from ( ~~1-(-'91
'Thr prohlem c~f a sur~nse mllauc~n lev~ would he m~re se~ere if there were non-indezed
hr~nd~ m the mt.del.
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{ ~ f V!- ~ó t Vá- 0. 1l follows that m(t) - mF, `d t, T(t) - O G T", d t, and
R(t)-x,~GR", `dt. Substitution into (20) yields:
m-~G(mF,0,0,a,~f,0)-hmrta4~i~0,
which cannot be. consistent with m(t)-mF, dt. Hence, the optimal caor-
dinated policies must be time inconsistent. 0
6. Time consistency, loss of leadership and optimal taxation
6.1. 11'un-cnoperntit~e pnlicies Ndthour pre-commitment
One way to obtain a time consistent plan for optimal taxation is for each
government to treat its price level or, alternatively, its stock of real money
balances as a predetermined rather than as a jump variable. This corres-
ponds to an open-loop Nash equilibrium between the government and the
private sector and therefore this solution to the time inconsistency problem
has been referred to as the 'loss of leadership' solution [Buiter (1983), Miller
and Salmon (1985)). The government effectively resigns itself to the fact that
it will be unable to pre-commit itself and therefore unable to manipulate the
price level or the holdings of real money balances. This means that the
shadow price of real money balances, J.,, is always set to zero, so that (?2) is
replaced by i.,(t)-0, b't?0.
The loss of leadership solution or the open-loop Nash equilibrium without
pre-commitment leads to T(t) - T" and g(r) -g" (see Proposition 1). lt follows
from (17), (18) and (15) that consumption of home goods, imports and
employment are given by





1-1xi f xa)~l1 -az1-1" G 1-aj, (32)
respectively. The distortions caused by direct taxes reduce the opportunity
cost of leisure, so that labour supply is less than in the first-best opUmum lor
than in the pre-commitment outcome). Hence, output and consumption of
home and foreign goods are below the levels attained in the first-best
optimum. The provision of public goods is excessive relative to the amount
provided in the first-best optimum (A" ~ a,(f). The public sector deficit ( 161 is
given by
d-~(x.-xz)xt~(a~ fxz)(1 -az)-d". (?ZI
F. run der PIneF. Cuordmanon tn uuerJrpendenr mnne~rurr ecnnr~mies 13
Nute that there is a public sector surplus when the weight attarhed to
impurted gouds, x~, exceeds the weight attached to puhlic goods, x,. The
dvnamic bchaviour of rcal moncy halanccti follows from 1~(11. that is
rit - rlm f d~ -~ix, mr"( rrt)'( x, f x, l(1 - x.l, m101- frce. 134)
F-ur a spccific functional form of rlml. sa}''
t'Iml-xs[mF log(nrl-nt]. Ii5)
une uhtains the eyuilihrium stuck uf real monev balanccs:
lim m(r1- ~f(x: - x, - t xsmr Ix,, [Ix, f x, Il l- xz )~ -f- ~ix, xs] -m". 1?61
If the public sector's accounts are approximately balanced or in deficit [if
x, - x, ~(x, t xZ II I- xZ Iry;(x, ~f) ; 0], the stock of real money balances is less
than the optimal yuantity of money. In fact, it will also be less than the stuck
uf real monev balances that obtains when both governments can pre-commit
themselves. The reason is that the loss of leadership sulution recognises that
the non-couperative policies of the two governments must he consistent, so
that there must he no incentive for any guvernment to renege by imposing a
surprise in(lation tax once money balances have been accumulated. In the
loss of Ieadership solution, private sectur agents accumulate Iess muney
halances, so that neither government has an incentive tu renege. Clearly, the
resulting non-cooperative outcome vields lower welfare than if pre-
rummitment was feasihle.
h.'. Cnu~~~c~rp~.r~durrit~r inrc~rnuNr~nu! polic.r cn~~rdi~rurinn
Nuw consider the loss of leadership solution when there is international
cuordination of macroeconomic policies and absence of pre-commitment.
This means that the world planning authonty takes the homc and forcign
levels of real liquidity as given at the time of the determination of thc
uptimal policies. Hence, i.,(r)-i.:It1-i.,(r1-0. `dt?0, implies frum (~81 and
(?91 l~f V'-0 and lyf F'q-0. It folluws that no distortionary taxes are
levied, r- t' - 0, d r? 0, and that the provision uf public guods is helow the
Icvcl pruvided under non-coopcraUve policy formulation wtth pre-
commitment. ,~~-,~~'-x,~i~K". In fact, the real levels of cunsumption of
hume and fureign guuds, publíc expenditure and leisure are exactlv the same
as the levcls attained in the first-hest optimum and therefore exceed thr levels
'rt,t~ ti~rm rncar.ul:~le. Ihr li~~anthmtr uuht~ (unruun. i~lnu-a„la~tml. Nhrre i„-7.nt, ~0
anJ 7,--U. whtch u~rrrtirundti t~~ ;~n mfimtr O(1!~1. m, -- i.
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attained under competitive policy formulation with loss of leadership. The
d~~namics of real moncy halances under coordination with loss of leadership
f~~Ilow from I~(11. that is
rii - ~Sm f~lx, - ~fmr"Iml. rnl~) - free.
The stead~-state stock of real m~nev balances is gi~~en hy
lim rnltl-~flx~mF - x,1'(~5~ (3xs) -mcc rnF,
1?71
~~hich is Iess than the OQM and therefore international polic~~ coordination
tiith loss of leadcrship is obviously inferior to the first-hest optimum:
C'-L''-UF-~r(mc)-r(ntF)-C~ccUF, 1?yl
where Uc denotes asymptotic welfare. Obviously, this is due to steady-state
in(lation, E1- x,~f; mc -~rc being higher than in the first-best optimum.
The non-cooperative Nash equilihrium without pre-commitment Isee sub-
section 6.1) gives rise to an asymptotic welfare of
C' - U' - Ur - logl 1-x:I-1x, f x2) log((x, f xz) x, ) f t~lm~l- t~lmr)
- UN G Ur. (40)
The welfare under this non-cooperative outcome with loss of leadership is
less than the welfare obtained in the first-best optimum, because thc levy of
distortionary taxes leads to a smaller labour supply and therefore to less
consumption of home and foreign goods and because the holdings of real
money balances are unlikely to coincide with Friedman's OQM [unless the
parameters satisfy xZ - x, -(x, f xZ )(1 - z2)S~(x, (f)]. There is a welfare loss
despite leisure and the provision of public goods being higher than in the
first-best optimum.
An unambiguous comparison of welfare under the non-cooperativfe out-
come without pre-commitment and welfare under the cooperative outcome
uithout pre-commitment is, however. not possible. Even though international
policy coordination in the absence of pre-commitment eliminates the distor-
tionary effects of taxation and therefore increases welfare, it may well lead to
a tower level of real money balances and therefore decrease welfare. lf the
latter etTect dominates, international policy coordination is counterpmduc-
tive. This is particularly likely to occur for small discount rates, since then
mc m~ ;(x~mF - x41'(x~mF f x~ - x4) c 1, (41)
f rari ilr-r Nfnr,~. CunrJ(rruunn rn inre.rJr~pr-rrJrru m~rnr(ar( ec ~rn~mties I S
and thiti may cause coordination to be futile, especially w~hen countries are
en~aged hea~il} in internaUonal trade Ihigh x~). Since the public sector
dcficit i, hitihcr undcr international poliry coordination than undcr compcti-
tive dccisic~n-making uithout pre-commitmcnt (d~ ~ z,~!), monetary growth
and infl:~tion are likcl} to hc higher under cooperatiun as well.
Thc rcascin th~ct intcrnational policy coordination may he countcrproduc-
tive is that it ex:rcerbates the credihility problems the governments face vis-:i-
~is thc hri~atc scctors [cL Rogoff 119H51]. Compctitive dccision-making has a
huilt-in check on each eovernment's incentive to renege hy imposing a
~urpn~c in(lation ta~ in an ~rttempt to emde the rcal value of money
halanccs. ~Thus, if thcrc is a unilatcral cxpansion of thc monetxr} growth ratc,
the marginal valuc of real mone} halances (i.) falls, consumption of home
and foreign g.oods increases and the resultine incipient balence of payments
deficit is choked off hy a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The
depreciation leads to intlation costs, w.hich provides a disincentive for
governments engaged in nein-cooperative decision-making to renege. Under
imernational policy cuordination such a built-in check does not exist, since
whcn hoth grncrnments multilaterally renege and incrPase their monetary
growth rates there will be no depreciation of the rcal exchange rate and
thcrefore no induced in(lation costs. Under international policy coordination
thc pri~ate sectors pereeive that the governments have a ereater incentive to
renege and are therefore forced to havc higher monetar} growth and
inllation ratcs than under non-cooperativc decision-making. This can render
intcrnational pc,licy coordination futile.
7. A numerical example
Tahlc I presents a numerical example that compares a first-best optimum
with cc~ordinated and competilive outcomes w~ith and without pre-
commitment. Thc first-hest optimum and coordination under loss of leader-
ship hoth ha~~e the OQM and no tax distortions, yet the latter is vastly
infcrior dur to rnurh higher intlation emding the holdings of real money
halances. [)ecentr:clised decision-making under loss of leadership yields
highcr wclfarc than a~ordination la w-clfare loss of 1.797 rathcr than I.KK51,
detipite the fact that hoth governments Ievy distortionary taxes and therefore
cut output, emplc~`.ment and consumption of home and foreign goods. The
rca,on wh} international poliry rnordination is counterproductive is that
thcrc is no longcr a disincentive to renege, since when both gvvernments
imputie a multilateral surprise in(laUon tax there will he no induced
derreciaticm of thc real exchange rate and therefore no in(lation costs. In
othcr wi~rds, coi~rdinati~in removes the threat of a depreciation and therefore
climinates a disinccntive to pursue an inflationan strateg~. It follow~s that
co~rdination undcr I~~ss of Icadcrship Icads to highcr inflation rates and
I;thlc I
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luHCr huldingti uf real mune} halances than decentralisation, ti~hich makes
cuordmatiun futile- Nute that cumpetiti~~e decisiun-making withuut pre-
~urnmitment Ic:tcí~ to a halanced puhlic sectur deficit in this example. hecause
7, - x,l -t1.'I. Buth roordination and dcccntralisation uith prc-commitmcnt
are superiur tu dcccntralisatiun H~ithuut prc-commitmcnt and a fortiuri
~ui~r~iinatiun H ithuut pre-cummitment, because the~ lead tu Iess tax distar-
ti~~m :tncl hiehcr sturks of rcal monc} halances. Also, courdination ~~ith prc-
cummitmcnt Icadti tir ,mallcr tax rates, highcr monctary gruHth ratcs and
highrr ~~clfarc th:tn dcccntrahsatir~n ~~ith prc-commitmcnt.`
S. ('oncluding remarks
A h~cr-cuuntr~ gcncral cquilihrium mudcl H~ith impcrfect substitutiun
hetween hume and forcign goods, agents that ha~~e home cash as thcir unl~
asset and (lerihle exchange rates has heen formulated. The mudel has micru
fuundations, su that the anal~~sis of w.elfare can be conducted in term~ c~f
consumcrs' surplus. Also, thc modcl has long-run trade-offs so that intcr-
national pulic~ coordinatiun is not merely a transient issue. The first-hest
~~ptimum achie~es the highest welfare a world planner can uhtain and
rurrespunds tu no tax disturtions, optimal quantities of monc~~ and unil
mariinal r:rtes uf suhstitution bctw~een puhlic and pri~ate goodti. Hu~c~rr,
the first-hest uptimum cannut he achieved in a decentralísed market rcun-
rrm~~. Fven thuugh cuordination in the absence of pre-commitment Ie:rds t~i
no tax distortiuns and the optimal provisiun of public goods, lack uf
credihilit} leads tu loo high inflatiun rates and thus to tuo lou~ holdines of
rc:rl money halances. Coordination in the ahsence of pre-commitment is
cuunterpruducti~~e. despite the fact that decentralisatiun Ieads tu tax distor-
tiuns. Thc reason is that decentralisation has a built-in disincenti~-e to renege.
for a unilateral surprise in(lation tax induces a depreciatiun of the exchange
ratc and in(lation custs. u hcrcas international pulicy cuordination has no
such disincenti~~e tu renege. When the governments can make hindine
annuunrements ahout future monetary pulicy, welfare is impru~~ed su Ihat
the t}pical tirlfare ranking is first-hest optimum, courdinatiun Hith pre-
`N'hrn thrrr r, nn di,ciiuntin~ I~i-(ll crrmreUtnr decrsiun-mahinE r, nrr lunger timr
rncrrn,r,tenl. ,n that the rre-airnmilmrnt und In„ of Ieader,hrp outcrrme, arrncrdr and u~rnt,
h~rlJ Ihr OO!~1 ihi, mean, Ihat Ihr puhhr ~rcux deficu and rn~rnrtan gre~wth ~re reru
Inlern:rtrun;rl rrnc~~ cnurJrn:rurrn under lus, uf Ir:rdenhi~ wrth ~- 11 Irad, Ir, IarEer ,tr~ct,, i~f
rr.rl mnnr, halance,, f~rr ~ir,rrnmenl, arr n~r lunEer rmp;ruent. ;rnd Ihrrefr~re IraJ, lir hrghrr
infl:rurro Intcrnaur~n:rl ~uhr~ ~u~xJrnauun wrth pre-c~~mmumrnt and ~i -ll rncrrase~ rral mnnr,
h.rl:rncr, to Ihc OV~1. ,rt re,enue, fn,m ,er~ni~r:r~r :rnd rn(luui~n are hrwrr ilur Irr thr (arr thut
t:rie, ,rrr hrghrr th:rn Huh ilr,r~runun~ Thr rrwlt that currdrn:rtuin r, w„r,e th:rn rr~mrrUU~e
Jrrr,rnn-muArn~ uniler Irr„ ~rf Icadrr,hi~,ull hulA, whrn ~~--U.,mcr rn thr fir,t c:r,c !- I~1~
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commitment, decentralisation with pre-commitment, decentralisation without
prc-commitment and coordination without pre-commitment.
Whcn thc gamc bclwccn thc govcrnmcnts and thc private scctor~ is
rcpcatcd indefinitelv and the discount ratc is not too high, thc governmrnts
rni~ht he ahle to huild up a reputation for sticking to announced policie~ (cf.
Rarm and Gordon 119R31] and thcreforc intcrnational policJ rnc~rdinati~~n
ma~~ bc worthwhile. Whcn onc allows for 'scvcrc' punishmcnt str,rtct~ics, it is
possihlc, for a given discount rate and givcn punishmcnt intcn~als, to sustain
lo~~cr inflation rates than under the expectational rulcs c~nsidercd h~ Barro
and Gordon [Rogoff I19Ktí1]. Similarl~~, reputations mav dcvclop and courdi-
nation may he pmductive when there is imperfect information and the gcrme
is rcpcated a finite numher of times [cf. Backus and Driffill 119RS1] or w.hen
the crnnomies are stochastic [Currie and Levine (19R61]. Rogc~fT Ilyhhl
prm~idcs an excellent survey of reputational issucs and points out that
repeated-game models replace a'cooperation' problem with a'coordination
prohlcm'. Rogoff (19K61 also considers severe punishmcnt and trigger strat-
cgies, the prohlem of multiple equilibria, the implications of a continuum of
decision-makers. the efTects of private information, and extcnsions to multiplc
cwcrnmcnts in an international context. Alternatively, in a richer model thc
problem of time inconsistency may disappear when the governments can
issue a sulTiciently rich maturity structure of government nominal and
indexed debt [cC Lucas and Stokey (19R31, Persson, Persson and Svens~c~n
119R51]. The interplay hetween time inconsistency, reputations and structure
c~f financial asscts on the one hand and the potential bcnPfits from
international policy coordination on the other hand, seem an interesting
avcnue for further research.
One could argue that, if policies can be pre-committed vis-à-vis the private
sectors, then international policy coordination is probably also feasible. This
argument might exclude the possibility of deccntralisation with pre-
commitment. If one also argues that coordination between two govcrnments
bcing fcasihle implies that pre-commitment is feasible, then this might rule
out coordination without pre-commitment and therefore the paradox of the
counter-productive nature of policy coordination discussed in Rogoff I19R5)
and in this paper might become a theoretical curiosum. However, it seems
likely that it is easier to sustain cooperation between governments Ivia
appropriate threat and punishmcnt strategies or via a reputational mechan-
i~ml than to ensure a credible pre-commitment to announced government
policies vis-à-vis a large group of atomistic private sector agents. Neverthe-
less, further research should attempt to explain what sustains intcrnational
cooperation in the ahsence of pre-commitment.
ln future research, the issue of credibility and subgame perfection should
hc furthcr im~cstigated. Thc loss of leadership solutions, cmployed in section
f,. coincides W ith the open-loop Nash equilihrium solution, hence it is time
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consistent but not necessarily subgame-perfect lor credible). The appendix
sh~~H~s how one can calculate the subgame-perfect solution, hut in general
this is a ven difficult exercisc as it is difTicult to find the functional form of
the ~alue functions for n~nlinear models and n~n-yuadratic preferences.
Ho~~ever. the prohlem may not be too serious for the particular model
discuacd in this papcr. The credibility problc:m is due to thc fact that there
is an es post incentive to levy a surprise in(lation tax, which permits a cut in
the distortionan income tax land an inerease in government spendingt. Since
mone~ is the only asset, an}' gain from a surprise inflation must he captured
instantancously and therefore it secros that thcre is no remaining incentive
for a surprisc inllation in the case of coordination with loss of Icadership,
especiall} as hoth taxes and government consumption are already at their
first-hest Icvels.'' For the case of competitive decision-making, it is not
immediatel} clcar what the effect of suhgame perfection would he and this
rcmains an important area for further research.
Anolher area of further rescarch is to extend the model to three or more
ec~nomies. Even if pre-commitment is feasible, international policy coordina-
tion hetween two countries may be counterproductive when there are third
countries that tighten their monetary policies in response to attempts to
a~ordinate policies in the two countries under consideration [cC Canzoneri
and Henderson 119KG)]. Also, an investigation into the potential henefits of
different regimes, e.g.. fixed versus flexible rates, may he useful [cC Canzoneri
and Gray 1 19R51, McKibbin and Sachs (19R6t]. Finally, it is essential to
make the model more realistic by allowing for bonds and capital accumu-
lation [e.g. Lipton and Sachs (1983t. Buiter (1986)] and perhaps for currency
substitution. This may accentuate the results of this paper. An increase in the
home monetary growth rate increases home in(lation, reduces the world real
interest rate and therefore increases output, capital and employment at home
and abmad. Hence, each country wants to transfer the burden of lowering
the world real interest rate to the other country, so that decentralised
decision making Nith pre-commitment Ieads to too low monetary growth
ratcs [van dcr Plocg (19Rfia)].
Appendix: Credibilit}~ and sub~amr-perfect optimal taxation
It is not clear that the loss of leadership solution concr~pts employed in
section b arr credihle. The reason is that the loss of leadership solution
coinctdcs Hith the open-loop Nash eyuilibrium solution, hence it is time
c~~ntiistcnt hut not ncccs~arilv suhgamc pcrfcct ur crediblc. Indeed, Oudiz and
Sachs IIyK51 arFue that as Ume proceeds the expectatiun~ of the private
tircturti :tre not fulfilled as the private sectors' anticipati~ins of future
' Thi. .irEumrni n Jue i~~ i~nr ~~f thc rcfrrcrti.
'(1 F ~'an Ji~r Pl~~e~, Cuurdinnt~un in mterdeprndi~nf monernrr ecun~~mirs
go~crnment ~olic~~ are not the loss of leadership outcomes. In other words,
thc go~crnmcnt~ ha~c an ir~centive to announce Eolicies that are dilTcrcnt
from the loss ~f Icadership policies and that are helieved hy the private
sectors. Such Ooliries should he subgame perfect, so that announced ~olicies
~hould hc raUonal to hc carried out if called upon to d~ so at some later
date. The retiulting outcomes are hased on feedback (or suhgame-Oerfect)
Starkelhcrg cyuilihrium solutions [Simaan and Cruz (1973h1. Ba~ar and
Ul~dcr 119R~1] hetween each government and its pri~ate sector and can hc
~icriccd H ith thc aid rlf dvnamic programming.
1 hc re~rc~cntati~e houschold takes pmfits, thc wage rate, the exchangc
r;itc and the inflaticm rate as given, so that its Hamilton Jacobi Rellman
cyuation is gi~cn h~~
l ;'-~ïl~n- max [C'Ic~.c~M.l`.,c,mlf ~~,"~~(1 -T)(N'1`-f.:)-r~-ecM-nrn',], (4')
~~ here l'"(t, rrr, r,K, n. e) is the houschold's value function. It follows that
r„ -(',rl l'ml. rM - CMlel',"~1 and. with LM E, 1- L(1 I- rl f'T), so that a
~1arkav-Ecrfect cyuilihrium must satisfy:
~ïl~n~ ~J„~-~f, logll~,"~Ifil~loglm)f~~mf~aVT~ilsml'm-0. 14?I
~~hcre ~f„-x,loglx,)fx2log(x2!c~)-fx~log(xjí~(1-T))fx,log(R1-I1-x,).
Íf, - -I1 -x.,l. ~.-xsmF, f~,- -xS. ~a- -(1 -r)(3 and (~a- -rz. Eq. 14i) is a
non-lincar ordinary differential equation, which can, in principle, be solved to
givc:
l~,"~ - drlm, r,,e, n, P). (44)
The goods market equilibrium condition can be written as 1',"~-~1(T,g),
wliich. together with the exchange market equilibrium condition, e-
fl !';~{, I'mr:l. viclds C-1 ~ 1- f'Ir,R, r',K') ~- r~lm) [see eq. (19)]. Eq. 144) l'T -
tl:,,el can be solved with e-F( ) to give an expression for inflation,
n-irlm,r.,c,n',,c'l. 14S)
whcre 1[,n - - (t) rn Vi~, ~i - - [~i - (IPt~~',~ ) f 1 )i~i]~~x. Í - T, ~„ and )'r~ -
- I d~,. :11.1' rfi,,. j- r',,c'. It follows that the household or government
hudget constraint can he written as
I 1 - x,l(~;-XI
rir -1 I- T)~f - - n( ')m - S2( m, r. ,c, r', R' ). 14(t)
,x,fx.~x,II-TI
f ran drr Plur,e, Conrdinurinn in interJepi~ndenr munetan e~onumies 2t
ti'hen the t~s~~ cr~untries are engaged in competitive (Nash-Cournotl policy
fc~rmulation, the Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman eyuation of the home govern-
mcnt is gi~en by
1~;'-~i{.c,-max[I'(-ifrlmlf t'mi2l If l",`~:Q'I I], (~71
Uhcre !'"(t.m.m`I iti thc value function of thc home government. It follows
that
I;t I~~~S2~t l',`~:52~`- lyf {'~;S1Qt 1'T'.S1q-0 (48)
must hold, which in symmetric Nash equilibrium yields r-T„(m,rn', 6'm, 1"m.)
and ,K - G11rn, m', l'm, l'm.). Substitution of T~;(.1, T~,.I I. GN( -) and GN( -) into
1~7) allows one, in principle, to solve for the asymptotic value function,
l'"( x, m, m') and conscquently for the asymptotic feedback policy rules,
,- T.,(m, m') and ,i;- G.~I m. m`). Upon substitution of these policy rules into
I~t~l, one can ohtain the path of real money balances.
Vdhen the two countries engage in international policy coordination, the
Hamilton- Jacohi- Bellman equation is given by
l~;`-~~{'"- max [l'( Itt~lm)f l"(-)tr(m')t l',"~521-)f t'm.4'( l], 1491
~~hcre l"(t.m.m') is the value function of the world planner. It follows that
t~~f {~f t mS2ri- i m.3[~- i'"9-} i~Q-} I'T7[9~ i m.S19-0 (50)
must hold, so that T- Tc-(m, m', Vm~, 6'm:) and K- Gc-Im, m', {'T~, l'T,). Ltpon
suhstituUon of T-( ) and G~(~) into (50), one can, in principle, solve for the
asyrnptotic world value function. l'"(r,m,m'), and the asymptotic poliry
fecdhack rulcs, T-(m,m') and Gc-(m,m').
Due to the analvtical difTiculties in solving for the value functions, it is
~~erv diflicult to characterise the subgame-perfect outcomes and one has to
resort to a complicated numerical algorithm. Such an algorithm effectively
nests a Runge-Kutta routine for the numerical integration of non-linear
c~rdinan di(Terential equations within a Gauss-Newton routine for numerical
~~ptimisaUon under constraints, which in turn is nested within another
Runge-Kutta routine. This presumably explains the popularit~ of the loss of
Icadcrship sc~luUc,n conccpts, tihich arc much casicr to calculatc. Cohen and
Michcl I19h41, Millcr and Salmon 119Ki) and Oudir and Sachs I19Ri{ suggest
" F. can d~-r NL~rR. C-n~~rdinarinn in inrerdrpcndenr mnnerarr ernnnmies
an alternative al~orithm for t,btaining time-consistent strategics. It is ha~ed
cin iterati~ns cif the stahle manifold associated With the ~eriect-feiresi~ht
sc,lution. ( ?(11. It is not clcar Whcthcr thcir stllution conccrt can hc adaptcd
tc~ deal with non-linear mcidels and non-quadratic preferences and Whethcr it
c~incides ~ith the suhgame-~erfect outcomes ~uggested ahcwe, hut for the
f,articular m~del di~cussed in this ~a~er the prohlem may not he tt,o ~erit,us.
II shc~uld hc ~tlintcd ~ut that thcrc arc othcr rcaconahlc outcc,mc~ that ma~~
be timc ce,nsistcnt. Onc cxam~le is thc opcn-I~op Nash equilihrium or Ic,s~ c~f
Ieadcrshi~ solutic~n suFgcsted hy Buiter ( 19R?), hut this is nc,t nece~sarilv
suhgame ~erfect. An~ther exam~le is hased cin re~utatit,nal eyuilihria
dcvclt,~Cd h~ Barm and Gc~rdc~n ( 19R31 and h~. Backus and I~rif(ill 119ítSl
~also see Rugofi ( 19R61 ft,r a survev]. Section R discusses thece issucs in mc~rc
detail.
References
Rackuc. Davrd and Jc,hn DrílTill. 19R5. In(lation and repulauon. American Frc.nomic Revíew 75,
t i(1 5 iR.
Rarr~. Rotxrt J. and [1 R Gordc.n. 19R3. Rules, díccretion and reputatir,n ín a model of
monetar~ pohc~. Journal of Monetary Economics I'. 101 121
Raser. Tamer and Geert L Ulsder. 19R1. D~namic non-cooperative game the~rv IAcademrc
Precs. Neu York I.
Ra~a', Tamer. Stephen J. Turnr,cck~ and V. d'Orey. 19R5, OPumal strategic monetan puliciec m
dvnamic interdePcndent ernnc~míes. Mimea IUniversitv of Illmois al l'rhana-ChampaíRnl.
Ruiter. Willem H.. 19X.. Opumal and ume-consistent policies in ce~nt,nuouc time rane~nal
exfxctauons models. L.S [ Ece~nometnc Programme. Diccutisic~n paper no. A39 1Le~ndcml.
Huíter. ~4'íllem H.. 19Rb. Fiscal pohcy in oPen inlerdependent ernnt.m,es. m: A. Razrn and [
Sadka. eds.. Ernm,mic pohc} ín Iheorv and practice IMacmillan. Lc~ndonl.
Ruiter. Willem H. and Richard C. Marston, edc. 19R5, Internatie~nal economic policy coord,na-
ut,n I(~ambridge Uníversity Prescl.
C;clvo. Gurllermo A., 197R, On the ume consistency of optimal pohcy in a monetary econom~,
Econometrica 46, 141 I- 142R.
Canionen. Matt B. and J.A. Gray, 19R5. Manetan polic~ ~ames and the rnnuquences of non-
co~perative txhaviour, International Economic Review '6, no. ?. 547-5(,4.
Camm~en. Matt R and Dnle V1 Hendersc,n. 19R6, Three countries and mahtion~. Chapter II r,f
SlrateRic aspectc of macrcxcnnomic policy makm~ in mterdefxndent ernnomies, Mimeo
( arlorzr. N. and John B. Taylor. 19R5, Internalíonal capual mobihtv and the coordination of
mcmelan rules, in J.S Hhandan. ed.. FxchanEe rate manaRement under uncertarnty 1!v11T
Precsl.
Cohen. Damel and Philip Michel. 19R4. Towards a theory of opdmal prc-commitmenL An
anah'srs of ume inconsistent equihhria, Discussion paper no. R412, CEPREMAP IPansl.
Cr,r,per. Richard N.. 1969. Macmeconomic Policy ad~ustment ín interdependent ernnomies.
Quarlerl~ Journal of Fconomics 9R, 545 Sb6.
Curne. l~avid A and Paul Levine. 19R5. Macroeconomic pohe~ decí~n in a.. rnterdependent
wc.rld, in N'.H. Burter and R.C. Merston. eds.. Internaur,nal economic pc,hc} cuord,nauc~n
ICambndge llnivercrt~ Prcssl.
Curne, f)avid A. and Paul Levrne. IQRh. CrediMlín and time ,nconc,aencv in a str,chasuc
uorld. Uiccuss,on paper no. 9~ ICentre for fconumrc P~hc~ Research. Lnndonl.
Feenara. Rotxrt. 19R6. Funcuc~nal eywvalencec hetween liyuidit} ce~ctc and the utilit~ cif mnnev.
Journal c~f Monctan Econom,cc 17. no '. '71 '9'
Flccher. Slanle~, IyRll. Dcnamrc rne~~ncictenc~, coc~perauan and the hene~olent d,cxmhlinF
gwernmenl. Je,urnal c~f t-cc~nc~mrc fhnamic~ and Cemlrc.l '. ~z If17
F. run dt~r PIneR, Cuordmurinn in interJependenr mcineturr ecnnomies 'i
Fnedman. Miltun. 19(.9, The nptimum quantily of money and other essays I.Aldme Pubhshing
Cumpany. (~hicagol.
Hamada. Rcach~. 1976. A strategic analysrs of monetary independence. Journal of Poliucal
famom~ RS. 677 7110
Hamada, Koichi. 147v, Macroeconomic strateg~ and coordinauun under (lexlble exchenge rates,
in R f)c~rnhusch and J A. Frenkel, eds., Internauonal economic pohcy Theor~ and e~~idence
Lluhn. Hopkms. Baltimorel.
1~mr.. M. IyK1. Inlcrnauonal IiquiJity a welfare analyxis, Quarterly lournal of Economics 9fi,
i ~i
F:ehix, Patnck J.. lyi{6, Inlrrnational pohcy cooperation may he undesirable. Reseerch
[)rpartmrnt StaR rrpurt 10? IFrderal Reser~e Bank of Minneapohs, Minneapolisl.
f:ehne. P:unck 1., lyk7. CoordmaUon of fiscal policies in a world economy. Journal of
S1i~nelan Fiunumicc 19. 349- i7b
K~dL~nd. f.F. and fdward Prescutt. 1977. Rules rather than discreuon. The ume inconsistenc~
uf upumal plans. Jc~urnal uf puhucal F:conomv 85. 471~91.
Lipwn. ha~id and Jeffrr~ Sachs. 19R3. Accumulation and growth m a two-country model: A
simulation approach. Journal of International Economics I5, I it- I 59.
Lucas. Robrrt E and Nancy Stokey. 1983. Opumal fiscel and monetary pohc} in an economy
withoul capilal, Journal of Moneten Economics 12. 55- 93.
McKihhin, W.J. and 1elTrey D. Sachs, Í9R6, Coordinalion of monetary and fiscal poGcies in the
OFCU, Workmg paper no- 18(xl (Nauonal Bureau of Economic Research. Cambndge, MAI.
Slillrr, !vlarcus and Mark Salmon, 19K5, pohcy coordination and dynemic games, in: W' H.
Buiter and R C. !slarstun, eds., Internauonal economic policy cuord~nauon ICamhndge
Universit~ Prrssl.
Oudiz Giller and 1efTrry Sachs. 19R5, Internatianal poGe~ coordinauon in d}namtc macroecano-
m~c mudels, in: ~1'.H Buiter and R.C. Marslon, eds.. Internataonal economic pohcy
coordin:cuon I(-amhndge llniversity Pressl.
Pers~un. M:ut. Tursten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson. 19R5, Time inconsistencv of fiscal end
m~~neucn pohcy, Semmar paper no 331 Ilnstitute for International Economic Studies,
StockhoÍml.
Plorg. Frcdrnck van der. 19R6a, Capilal accumulation, inllation and long-run conflict in
mternauunal oh~rcti~es. Discussion paper no. 'SO (Centre fur Labour Ecunomics, Londun
School uf Economicsl.
Plaeg, Fredenck can der, 19fi6b, Coordination of optimal taxation in a two-country eyuilibrium
mc~del. f-conomic Letters, forthcoming.
RoFofT. Kenneth. 19R5. Can international monetan policy cooperation be counterproductive?,
Journal of Internauunal Ecunomics IR. 199-?17.
RogulT. Kennelh, 19R6. Rrputauonal constraints on monetary pohcy, NBER Working paper no.
19tS(, INBER. Camhridge. MA1
Simaan. M. and Josr B Cruz. Jr., 1973a. On the Stackelberg slrategy in non-zero-sum games,
Juurnal of Opumizal~on Theory and Application I I. 53?-555.
S~maan, M and Josr B Cruz. Jr.. 1973h. Add~UOnal aspects of the Stackelherg strateg} in non-
zerc~-sum games. Journal of Opumizauon Theory and Apphcations I I. 61 i-b26.
Taylor. John B.. 19ltí. International polic~ coordinauun m thr design of macrorconomic pohcy
rulrs. ! uropean f:cunomic Review 2R, nos I?. 53-9?
Turne~ssk~. Strphen J and N'ilham A Brock, 19R0. T~mr consistency and opumal government
p~~licirs in prrfrct f~~rrsight eyuihhnum. Juurnal of Pubhc Ecunc~mics 13, IR1 ?I~.















Universítb Catholique de Louvnín
Tilburg Uníverslty
Croningen Uníversíty









Frederick van der Ploeg
Research Sta[[ and Resident Fellows
Anton P. Rarten






Frederick van der Plceg
Address: Hogeschoollean 225, P.O. Box 90153. 5~0 LE Tflburg, The Netherlends
Phone . ~3113663050
Telex . 52h26 kub nl
Telefe~c: y113663066
E-maíl : "CENTEReHTIKI185.BI1NET"
P.O. BOX 90153, 5000 LE TILBURG. THE NFTHFR~.ANDS
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
III II IIIIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII II IIIII III IIII IIII IIIIII II I IIIIII
1 7 000 O ~ ~ 69668 O
